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Chronic inflation is argued to be politically destabilizing.  We examine data on 
inflation and political instability that goes as far back as 500 years.  Although the 
behavior  of  both  prices  and  political  rebellion  have  changed  over  these  five 
centuries, and enduring relationship between price and political destabilization 
appears in our analyses.  This relationship may provide insight into the context 
from which neoliberalism emerged, potential reasons for its failure, and some of 
the key dilemmas upon which the post-2008 global economic order may hinge 
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After the 2008 credit market collapse, policy-makers feared a second coming of the Great 
Depression.  Immense amounts of society‟s wealth were tied up in a web of loans, securities investments 
and financial institutions whose collapse seemed imminent.  A similar collapse in 1929 resulted in a long, 
vicious cycle of default and deflation (Fisher 1933; Bernanke 1983; 1995), much hardship, political 
conflict, and ultimately war.  To prevent such a scenario from materializing, governments initiated a 
massive lending and spending program, designed to prevent banks‟ collapse, rescue major employers, 
create work and prevent an epidemic of personal bankruptcies.  These programs were financed by large 
deficits and a dramatic expansion of the money supply (Congressional Budget Office 2009; Gavin 2009), 
two often-cited causes of the chronic stagflation that plagued the world during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Sachs 1989; Barsky and Kilian 2001). 
Several observers believe that these responses to the financial crisis have created a serious risk of 
inflation in the coming years (Feldstein 2009; Meltzer 2009).  One potential byproduct of inflation 
problems is political disaffect and instability.  In his historical study of revolution in the early modern 
world, Jack Goldstone (1991) finds that chronic inflation, along with population pressures, produce a 
combination of mass hardship, elite conflict and a lurch towards government insolvency that makes states 
vulnerable to overthrow.  His theory is applied strictly to the pre-industrial modern world, but we argue 
similar processes may have continued to operate through modernity.  We analyze a data set of political 
revolt and inflation that stretches as far back as past five centuries into history, and find a longstanding 
relationship between these two variables.  This relationship persists in some form despite the fact that 
governments, economies and money systems have evolved a great deal over these 500 years.  Should we 
fall into a period of chronic global inflation again, political conflict may grow more heated, governments 
may find themselves embattled, and calls for major political-economic change may grow more strenuous.   
The Neoliberal Project may sit at the center of many battles over economic policy.  The 
discussion that ensue should not lose sight of the underlying problems that gave rise to neoliberal, which 
may persist today.  Neoliberalism emerged from a context of serious inflation, which signals a problem in Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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the mechanism by which economic resources are distributed.  Despite our apparent success in quelling 
inflation rates over the past decades, the world economy‟s distributional systems still exhibit stressors that 
might continue to produce problems. 
Inflation & Political-Economic Strain 
Why Inflation Control Matters.  Containing inflation is a key concern for macroeconomic 
policy-makers.  Their desire to avoid high inflation can be attributed to the fact that it evokes a range of 
economic, political and social problems.  High inflation hinders economic growth (e.g., Bruno and 
Easterly 1998), exacerbates inequality and worsens poverty (e.g., Bulíř 2001; Easterly and Fischer 2001; 
Albanesi 2007).  It can lead to vigorous redistributive battles (e.g., see Olson 1982; Smith 1992) and 
possibly a malaise in which people see society as being wrecked by exploitation, instability, lost morale 
and damaged national prestige (Shiller 1997).  Inflation seems to promote dissatisfaction with 
government; incumbent politicians face a greater likelihood of losing office when prices ar rising quickly 
(Lewis-Beck 1988; Palmer and Whitten 1999).  Studies have argued that inflation problems have 
contributed to political revolution both in the 20
th century (Hill, Butler and Lorenzen 1977; Looney 1982; 
Paldam 1987) and over history (Goldstone 1991).  According to David Hackett Fischer (1996), they have 
long historical relationships with the intensity of drug use, family disintegration and crime. 
Containing inflation is important because it represents an erosion of money‟s value, and in turn 
the ability of the money system to coordinate economic activity.  In broad terms, the destabilizing effects 
of serious, chronic inflation can be understood as a loss of a working money system, and in turn a 
disruption to the wide web of transactions, relationships and institutions that are premised on the 
availability of such a system.
i  Money enables people to engage in indirect exchange
ii, use debt, store 
value, plan and control economic enterprises, expand their possibilities for economic exchange and make 
individuated economic decisions (Weber 1978: 80 - 82).   It creates a framework upon which we rely to 
maintain accounts of individuals‟ claims on societal assets, and in turn their capacity to exchange these Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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claims for whatever assets they deem fit, without resorting to the much less tenable methods overt 
centralized monitoring and direct administration (Leijonhufvud 2003).   If the ingenuity, adaptability and 
dynamism of modern economic life is built on the information transmission capacities afforded by price 
signals (Hayek 1945), then money‟s absence could be expected to result in a much more stagnant 
economy, and a decline in material standards-of-living.  More profoundly, Simmel (2004) argues the 
money is a core element of modernity itself, whose existence has helped do things like emancipated us 
from older forms of economic bondage and granted our freedom to make personal economic choices.   
Money is a cornerstone of the large enterprises, economics of scale, economic specialization and 
diversification and personal choice that are fundamental to modern economic life.  Its absence would 
force a dramatic reorganization of the modern economy, and probably a loss of many non-economic 
facets of social life that we prize. 
Inflation Has Not Been Conquered.  Over the past decade, most of the world has been able to 
secure a level of price stability that is extraordinary by historical standards, second only to the level of 
stability attained during the post-WWII Bretton Woods system.  Between 2000 and 2008, only fifteen of 
the 154 countries for which data is available saw rates exceed 40%
iii in at least one year: Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Montenegro, Myanmar, Romania, Serbia, Suriname, Turkey and Zimbabwe.  This list might can create an 
impression that inflation problems are the concern of underdeveloped, conflict-ridden or mismanaged 
countries.  Inflation as not been a pressing issue in the West for more than 20 years, a track record that 
could be construed as a long history of successful price control.  Until recently, one might have been able 
to claim with some credibility that enlightened governments had conquered inflation.   
If we consider this record from a long-run historical perspective, 20 years of price stability is 
quite short, and the proposition that advanced economic science created an immunity to price system 
crises seems dubious.  A long-run perspective suggests that world-systemic crises of money are a 
recurrent feature of economic history, and have occurred as recently as the 1970s and 1980s.  Inflationary Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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crises tend to cluster in history, and these clusters affect the world‟s most advanced and powerful 
countries along with those at the periphery.   
The inflationary crisis of the late-20
th century and our current crisis suggest that economics is 
nowhere near the point where it can keep us from putting the money system into jeopardy.  Even if they 
have devised workable theories for stopping it once it start – for example by cutting the money supply and 
triggering a major recession – these solutions can be impractical, especially when people are experiencing 
serious economic hardship and we face a simultaneous threat of deflation.  These theoretical solutions can 
also be impractical if the state itself (and, by extension, general societal order) is imperiled.  Our analysis 
below suggests that this jeopardy is raised during periods of chronic inflation. 
Past and Present Crises of Money.  Money system crises are a recurrent feature of economic 
history (Goldstone 1991; Fischer 1996; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009), although their character has changed 
with the passage of time.  Figure 1 depicts the inter-quartile range of reported inflation figures over a 
sample of seven countries for which inflation data is present in at least 65% of the 517 years examined 
here.
iv    The next section provides details on the data. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
This graph does not offer a clear sense of when money systems have fallen into crisis historically.  
From a late-modern vantage point, it paints a picture of perpetual crisis before the mid-19
th century.  Its 
purpose is to impart a sense of how the behavior of prices has changed over history.  What is 
conventionally considered to be “stable” inflation today – a slow, steady inflation of 2% - 5% per annum 
with a low likelihood of deflation – is unique to the 20
th century.  Inflation was highly variable, both 
across countries and within countries over time, and deflation was common.  Price stability in earlier 
centuries often meant absolute stability in the form of longer-term mean rates that were close to zero, 
produced by shorter-term inflationary spikes offset by recurrent deflations.  In contrast, inflationary crises 
typically did not involve enduring spikes of very high inflation, but were instead produced by the Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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cumulative effects of (by modern standards), small upticks of annual inflation rates of around 0.75% to 
1% and a declining incidence of inflation.   
To a contemporary observer, a one percentage point difference that separates periods of chronic 
inflation from stability seems extraordinarily low, making it hard to envision how earlier waves were 
disruptive.  Historical periods of chronic inflation lasted for comparative long periods of time (from 50 to 
100-plus years, depending on how one wants to date them), and thus amounted to large cumulative 
effects.  Perhaps more importantly, early modern societies were likely less able to adjust to changing 
prices than today, and any effort to make sense of previous centuries‟ inflation by drawing analogies to 
present-day experiences must account for the underdevelopment or absence of institutions and practices 
that we now use to minimize the disruption caused by prices changes to both public finances and private 
relationships.   
Many of the means that we now employ to offset the strains of inflation either did not exist or 
were not widely used before the 19
th, or even 20
th, centuries.  For example, inflation indexation
v only 
began to be experimented with near the end of the 18th century, and only went into wide use after World 
War II.
vi  Mass use of interest-bearing savings accounts (let alone more sophisticated investment options) 
only began to appear in the early 19th century as philanthropic organizations designed to promote savings 
among the poor (Verdier 2002: 40).
vii  In earlier centuries, government income relied on land rents (often 
drawn to long, fixed rates) and only progressively moved to sources that would respond well to general 
price changes (Goldstone 1991).  These innovations – inflation indexation, mass access to interest-bearing 
accounts and a tax structure that is more responsive to general price changes – are a limited subset of the 
many institutions upon which we rely to maintain the value of our income and wealth, and solvency of 
our governments, when facing inflation.  Without them, even a slow persistent inflation could push a 
government, private enterprise or larger society into insolvency over decades. These differences can be 
difficult to see when prices are examined in shorter time frames, but culminate in large cumulative 
changes in prices over decades.  Despite their apparent modesty in terms of year-to-year inflation, these Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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waves constituted a slow deterioration of many people or enterprises‟ economic conditions, a problem 
that ultimately culminated in a range of serious societal stressors.   
Between the 16
th and 18
th centuries, historians have evidence of two periods of secular inflation 
lasting several decades.  Although they may quibble about how to date their beginnings and ends, there 
appears to be a clear sense that chronic inflation was well underway from 1550 – 1650 and 1750 – 1820 
(Goldstone 1991; Fischer 1999; Allen 2001; Arestis and Howells 2001).  Both periods culminated in 
societal calamity: the General Crisis of the 17
th century (see Steensgaard 1997) after the former, and the 
widespread instability that surrounded the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars after the latter.   
During the 19
th century, deflation, rather than inflation, was the most common price system 
failure with which people dealt.  These deflationary crises are believed to have been produced by 
outbreaks of massive default, bank panics, systematic withdrawals of money from circulation, an 
emerging scarcity of money, and further bankruptcy (Fisher 1933).  There are good reasons to avoid 
deflation: they destroy economic production, result in major job losses, cause epidemics of bankruptcy 
and, as the Great Depression demonstrated, can produce severe economic hardship.  After the Great 
Depression, governments developed a strong and lasting aversion to deflation (Bordo and Eichengreen 
1998: 429ff), and several means to avoid it, like monetary and fiscal stimulus, deposit insurance and 
banking regulation.  These changes to monetary system governance resulted in persistently inflationary 
price changes throughout the 20
th century, which are depicted in a box plot of inflation rates in an 
unbalanced panel of 164 countries
viii  below in Figure 2. Note that the graph suppresses outliers. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
The figure suggests two periods of widespread inflation.  The first period, which ran from 1939 to 
1952, is a likely result of war debts and a collapsed international financial market following WWII.  
Countries eventually renegotiated a stable international monetary order under the Bretton Woods Accord, 
which brought roughly twenty years of unparalleled global price stability.  These changes produced a Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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sense that price system pressures could be managed well, provided that governments could muster the 
foresight, responsiveness and political will to prevent the economy from “over-heating” as a result of too 
much growth and employment. 
This stability came undone when the Accord collapsed in 1971, and the Western price systems 
were shocked by the OPEC embargo of 1973.  The result was a chronic inflation that afflicted the world 
system for another twenty years. This period saw spectacularly high levels of inflation in developing 
countries, with rates that resemble those of the now-rich world during the 16
th and 17
th centuries.    This 
inflation crisis, which saw the coincidence of slow growth and runaway prices, shattered our sense that 
inflation was well understood and could be conquered.  The event damaged the credibility of the 
economic theories that underwrote post-Depression economic dirigisme, served as a platform from which 
anti-government intervention policy movements sprang, and created economic and political turbulence 
that gave rise to neoliberalism.  The experience of the 1970s and 80s suggests that the price system can 
still break down, and that these crises of money can still disrupt society and politics.  We may be able to 
withstand a steady but low inflation, but appear to remain vulnerable to serious price system disruptions. 
In the ten years that followed 1995, world prices were again very stable.  This track record 
produced another widespread confidence that the puzzle of inflation had been solved.  Rather than seeing 
governments as our emancipator, great faith was invested in the market system, which was thought to 
spread risk and respond to price pressures so quickly that systemic crises of money would automatically 
be averted.  This faith in the market underwrote many of the reforms that arguably contributed to the 2008 
crisis, including financial deregulation, a nurturance of private financial institutions and “financial 
innovation”, and loose monetary policy.   
What Causes Inflationary Crises?  Scholars offer a range of explanations for the incidence of 
inflationary crises.  Goldstone‟s (1991) account of inflation in the early modern world stresses the 
importance of demographic booms, brought on by the recession of disease, which cause increased Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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demands on essentials like food, housing and energy.  Fischer (1996) also sees demographic expansion as 
providing an initial impetus for rising prices
ix, but see long-term inflation as a result of the 
institutionalization of a type of inflationary psychology, in which react to mass perceptions of 
perpetually-rising prices by doing things like trimming coins, hoarding  goods or engaging in speculative 
activity.  These are all viable ways for individuals to cope with inflation, but amount to a self-fulfilling 
prophesy when these reactions further debase money, cause goods to be withdrawn from markets, and 
encourage speculative bubbles.  Quantity of money theorists stress the importance of increases in the 
supply of money, for example through governments‟ debasement of their own currency or the influx of 
American gold (e.g., Fisher 1989).  More recently, some economists have argued that modern money 
supply growth follows chronic government deficit (Fischer, Sahay et al. 2002), implying that it is over-
spending governments that ultimately spur inflation.  Others have stressed the role of war in spurring 
prices (a notion reviewed and criticized by Thompson and Zuk 1982). 
Demographic strain, inflationary psychologies, loose monetary policy, government debt and war-
making are all probably part of a larger and more complex process that causes price systems to break into 
chronic inflation.  Our interest is not in discerning which of these factors is the “true” cause of inflation. 
In all probability, these theories touch upon some aspects of the complicated process that pushes prices 
sustainably upwards, and our focus is on inflation‟s effects on state rule. 
However, it is worth noting that neoliberalism was a pragmatic attempt to tackle many of these 
problems simultaneously.  By pursuing growth aggressively, it sought to enlarge the world‟s capacity to 
absorb its ever-growing population without running into situations of scarcity that plagued earlier 
societies in Goldstone‟s historical accounts.  It failed in part because it was so successful.  In enriching 
millions of people, and doing so through global trade, it pushed us up against our limits to fuel this 
enrichment using gas and oil, and hurt our environment in the process (Centeno and Cohen 2010).  Many 
of the government cutbacks that were advanced under neoliberalism were designed to restore fiscal 
balance and ultimately facilitate the repayment of debt.  The stable economic prosperity that was probably Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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required to pay down these debts was short-lived, governments‟ efforts to reduce debt was often half-
hearted.  Neoliberalism also ushering in an era in which governments were probably less inclined to 
expand money supplies sustainably, but some have argued that the US Federal Reserve‟s aggressive use 
to monetary policy to quell financial panics
x created perceptions that America‟s central bank would 
aggressively fight financial market downturns, thereby causing investors to assume greater risk with more 
confidence (this argument, which concerns the so-called "Greenspan put", is discussed briefly in 
Goodhart 2008). 
What the Neoliberal Revolution did not do was contain speculation.  Financial investment grew 
markedly over the past three decades, and the vehicles through which one could profit from financial 
investment multiplied.  This development was convenient for governments in many respects.  It allowed 
them to off-load pension obligations, profit from the sale of publicly-owned enterprises, and draw credit 
from a deeper pool of private finance.  Governments themselves profited from financial investment, and 
inward investment could help ease the balance of payments strains that occur as a result of trade deficits.  
While they carried debt, strong financial markets lowered the costs of debt service.  It also made them 
vulnerable to financial markets.  A collapsing financial market could subject countries to balance of 
payment, currency or debt crises. Financial markets‟ flourishing created powerful lobbies, tied broad 
cross-sections of society‟s wealth to these markets‟ performance, led to increasingly aggressive risk-
taking, and created massive financial institutions whose failure would imperil the entire financial system.  
When these risks culminated in the 2008 crisis, policy-makers faced the prospects of a deflationary spiral, 
and chose (or were forced) to respond in ways that ultimately threatened inflation.  Neoliberalism 
attempted to quell many problems that have traditionally spurred inflation, which found varying degrees 
of success.  However, the containment of speculation was not one of them. 
Producing Political Instability.  In the 20
th century, chronic inflation has been associated with 
economic hardship, perceptions of societal injustice and declining well-being, political dissatisfaction and 
general malaise.  These problems may explain how general populations can come to dislike their Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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governments or vote out incumbents in democratic systems, but a diffuse popular anger generally 
provides limited power in explaining serious revolts that create existential threats to states.  Goldstone‟s 
(1991) offers a richer and quite plausible theory of how chronic inflation could contribute to a process 
that simultaneously helps the formation better-organized and –resourced anti-state movements and 
weakens states‟ ability to counteract any challenges that may arise.  He argues that the combination of 
long-term population growth and inflation produced a combination of general popular hardship, elite 
competition and declining government solvency that ultimately channeled mass disaffect into coherent, 
powerful political movements that could challenge debilitated states.  His study relies heavily on 
demographic pressures as a cause of both inflation and instability, and is strictly applied to the pre-
industrial world.  These processes, he argues, ceased to operate after the Industrial Revolution.   
We have already noted that causes of chronic inflation need not involve population growth.  The 
late-20
th century reappearance of inflationary crises may ultimately be helped by the spread of 
development (rather than population growth itself), which strains energy supplies (rather than basic 
commodities like food) to create a Goldstone-like, real economy-based inflationary pressure.  Again, our 
intent is not to show what causes inflation specifically, but rather to show that contexts of inflation are 
politically destabilizing.  The three factors that Goldstone presents as mediating the inflation-instability 
relationship – mass hardship, elite conflict and government insolvency – could conceivably occur strictly 
under inflation. 
The mass economic hardship and elite competition that materialize under inflation are both rooted 
in the fact that changing prices can be economically destabilizing and can produce redistributive battles.  
Its destabilizing aspects are not necessarily the product of rising prices themselves, but rather their 
propensity to coincide with price volatility (see below).  Such a context threatens economic actors‟ real 
income, wealth and solvency.  If general prices outrun one‟s wages, revenue or returns on investment, the 
result is an impoverishment in real terms.  In a context of uncertainty, individuals will try to shore up their 
wealth through efforts to contain their expenses and push up their revenues by securing price rises that Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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outpace general inflation.  The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of increased real price demands, spurred 
by an inflationary psychology similar to that posited by Fischer (1996). 
The non-wealthy are typically ill-equipped to stay ahead of prices in such a context, because they 
typically lack the bargaining power to wrest price concessions for their counter-parties.  During previous 
inflationary periods, real wages have stagnated (Allen 2001).  For those who rely on charity or 
redistribution for income, the situation can be worse.  Both donors and governments face economic 
strains in these contexts, which makes generous transfers to a potentially burgeoning class of poor less 
likely.  Britain‟s ill-fated Speenhamland system, made famous by Polanyi (2001), was formed to deal 
with the problem of the poor at the cusp of the 18
th century inflationary wave.  The difficulty with that 
system, as with mid-20th century state welfare programs, is that they are costly and increasingly difficult 
for states to finance when inflation is chronic and their own budgets are strained.  Governments are often 
reluctant to fully index welfare or pensions to prices (Easterly and Fischer 2001), making the real value of 
these payments lower. 
One interesting difference between previous centuries‟ inflationary waves and the chronic 
inflation of the 1970s and „80s was that unionization, and a rich legal infrastructure that bolstered union‟s 
bargaining positions, left many workers with a greater capacity to wrest wage concessions from their 
employers (including governments themselves).  Workers‟ ability to secure better concessions through 
unions attracted a great deal of attention, and blame, for inflation (Smith 1992).  Union power, and their 
role in producing economic crises, became the subject of many conservative political parties, and their 
electoral success often resulted in changes to the rules that empowered them in distributional struggles.  
Even where anti-union platforms were not key elements of ruling parties, the fact that governments‟ own 
budgets were strained by public employee wages probably played a role in their loss of many legal 
protections that were the centerpieces of mid-century policies. Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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Employers‟ struggles with unions illustrates several important points about inflation‟s effects on 
those who are more economically powerful.  First, they too became enmeshed in distributional battles.  
Second, the power they enjoy in these battles is often shaped by law and convention.  Just as labor law 
empowered unions vis-à-vis employers, the practice of renting land at long fixed rates enriched free 
tenants at the expense of rentier landlords in the early modern world (Goldstone 1991).  In many late-
modern developing countries, Import Substitution Industrialization‟s (see Bruton 1998) trade 
protectionism likely strengthened domestic industry‟s ability to wrest price concessions from distributors, 
retailers and ultimately consumers.  Bargaining power‟s relation to law and conventionalized practice 
means that it can be altered by states.  Under these circumstances, economic rules can be the subject of 
political conflict.  When reasonably well-organized and –resourced parties find themselves on opposing 
sides of such a battle – like pre-Civil War English gentry and landed aristocracy, or Stagflation-era unions 
and major employers – the result is elite conflict.  Such conflicts can put states in the compromising 
position of having to take sides, possibly alienating a powerful constituency in the process. 
A third and final inflation-related pressure on political instability involves government finances, 
and ultimately affects the state‟s capacity mollify or suppress potential challengers.  Government 
solvency erodes during periods of chronic inflation, in part it increases demands for public outlays while 
hurting their ability to extract new revenues.  Inflation pushed up the costs of ongoing government 
operations, and can be exacerbated if accompanied by increasing demands for new forms of spending.  In 
the face of rising costs, the state can have difficulty raising revenue commensurately.  Like wages, taxes 
are difficult to change and take time to accrue into state coffers, and any effort to alter taxation is bound 
to stir resentment, particularly when non-state actors are being hurt economically.  In the early modern 
world, these problems were particularly acute because state revenues were principally drawn by rents on 
land, and were thus plagued by the same pressured faced by private rentiers (Goldstone 1991).  With the 
passage of time, governments were able to develop other forms of taxation that were more responsive to 
changing prices, like tariffs or income taxes.  Still, experiences during the 1970s suggest that these newer Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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forms of taxation can have difficulty keeping up with rising general prices as well.  The result was that 
governments in the 1970s did what they have typically done under high inflation: accumulate debt and, in 
many cases, print money. There simply is not enough money to emolliate everyone, and the pressure to 
either cut spending or draw new taxes is likely to alienate someone.   
There are, of course, limits to the amount of taxes and credit that governments can draw, and, 
once creditors lose their inclination to lend, the state‟s ability to finance its operations is crippled.  In 
some cases, like Bolivia in the 1980s or the Weimar Republic, governments will simply print money, 
which ultimately destroys its value.  Financial constraints limit the state‟s ability to contain financial 
hardship through spending or government employment, and, perhaps most critically, their capacity to 
fund the coercive apparatus of the state.  Armies and police forces need to be equipped and fed, and their 
deprivation is bound to affect morale and loyalty adversely.  This means that, just as the state lurches 
towards a position in which they may need to suppress (rather than placate) its people, serious questions 
can emerge about its marshal forces‟ ability or willingness to do so. 
During the 1970s, a variety of factors led governments to assume very large debts, whose 
overhang persists today.  They probably include decreased real tax revenues resulting from economic 
stagnancy, the rising costs of ongoing and new expenditures brought about by stagflation, and a sovereign 
lending bubble that temporarily allowed governments to cushion the effects of the crisis by borrowing and 
guaranteeing others‟ debts.  When this bubble burst in 1982, much of the world found itself embroiled in 
a debt crisis.  In many cases, the result was government bankruptcy, seigniorage, free-falling exchange 
rates, hyperinflation and a “lost decade” of development.  Dictatorships rose and fell over much of the 
developing world during this period.  Although the effects or presents of these or similar problems in the 
communist bloc is not entirely clear to us, we do know that Soviets suffered major shortages (including 
food) (Åslund 1994) and experienced inflation in a different form: rationing. Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
15 
 
The strains of debt, and developing countries‟ need for infusions of foreign currency after the 
collapse of their own money, bore great affinities, if not clear causal links, to the adoption of 
neoliberalism.  The clear causal links involve many countries‟ implementation of neoliberal reforms as 
preconditions for the receiving aid in debt refinancing (e.g., the Brady Bond Plan, or Eastern Europe‟s 
“shock therapy”) or emergency loans (e.g., IMF conditionality).  Less directly, but perhaps no less 
importantly, neoliberalism‟s pursuit of export earnings, inward investment and privatization proceeds 
helped infuse foreign currency into their economies, which could help restore the value of their money.  
Financial deregulation helped make these countries more attractive to international investors, and thus 
served this hunger for external money. 
Weak Money, Weak States and Economic Change.  A weak money system is predicted to 
threaten states, a relationship that has been observed in comparative-historical studies of past centuries‟ 
periods of chronic inflation.  These problems reemerged in the 1970s and 1980s, a period of great 
economic stress, political conflict, and ultimately institutional change.  The changes that emerged from 
that crisis can just as easily be understood as a struggle to restore order to the world‟s money systems as a 
massive ideological conversion to laissez-faire economic philosophies.  Neoliberal reforms sought to 
rectify many of the problems that are believed to produce inflation, like government deficits, loose 
monetary policy or slow growth, but they did not contain speculation.  Whether this permissive attitude 
towards financial speculation stems from a believe that unfettered financial markets were self-correcting 
or from a hunger for capital to cover debts and finance growth, it ultimately resulted in the 2008 crisis, a 
threatened deflationary spiral, and policy redresses that now threaten to bring back inflation. 
A key element of this argument is that inflationary crises push governments into positions of 




We examine the historical relationship between chronic price volatility and political instability 
through a quantitative analysis of two data sets. The first, “long-run” set is an unbalanced panel of seven 
states with at least 300 years of inflation and political instability data from 1492 to 1900.
xi  The second, 
“late modern” set cover the post-World War II era, but allows for much more cross-sectional 
representation and the inclusion of better controls. 
Data 
 Political Instability.  Political instability data in our long-run set was gathered in a project led by 
the late Terry Boswell and assisted by us (Boswell, Linton and Cohen 2007), which quantified the 
presence or absence of revolutionary situations
xii, a measure that considers successful and failed 
challenges against the state.  Our second, “late-modern” set had better cross-sectional representation, but 
is restricted to the post-WWII era.  Political instability is measured by Bank’s Cross-National Time 
Series’ (2007) measure of revolts, defined as “Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, 
any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is 
independence from the central government.”   In both cases, political revolt is coded as a binary variable. 
Inflationary Pressure.  Long-run inflation data was compiled from many sources (Friis and 
Glamann 1958; Parenti 1967; Barquín Gil 2001; Ozmucur and Pamuk 2002; O'Donoghue, Goulding and 
Allen 2004; CBS Statistics Netherlands 2009; Global Finance Data 2009; Officer and Williamson 2009; 
World Bank 2009; Allen n.d.; Economic History Association n.d.; Global Price and Income History 
Group n.d.).
xiii Appendix A describes how these data were compiled to produce inflation figures that 
correspond to sovereign governments in the early modern world.  For our modern set, inflation data from 
1960 comes from the World Development Indicators, and over the earlier parts of the 20
th century from 
Global Finance Data. 
We consider two specifications of “long-term inflationary pressures” in our analysis.  The first 




xiv A problem with using inflation rates as a predictor of political revolt over such a large time 
frame is that the behavior of prices has changed dramatically over history.  A ten-percent, two-percent or 
negative inflation rate means very different things in 1650, 1880, 1955 or 1985.  In response to this 
problem of periodicity, we break the sample down into separate phases of historical inflation and stability 
(see below) and examine them separately. 
Our second specification of price pressures follows the notion that unpredictable inflation is 
qualitatively different from high but predictable inflation.  Some scholars have argued that a stable rate of 
price growth can be incorporated into actors‟ economic calculuses (Friedman 1977), and need not 
produce the uncertainty that strains economic, and in turn political, relationships.  Below, we find that, 
while inflation rates exhibit some degree of long-run cyclicality, price volatility has been declining 
steadily over time, although it is positively related to inflation rates on a year-by-year basis. 
Controls.  Finding control variables that stretch far back in time is difficult.  Many of the 
variables that could conceivable affect the process being examined here are sparsely measured, if at all, 
prior to the 1960s.  In the long-run set, we consider Kondratieff Waves and cycles of hegemony (from 
Chase-Dunn 1998) and the incidence of major war (also from Boswell, Linton et al. 2007).  These are 
system-level measures that are constant within years, which try to tease out, in very rough terms, the 
effects of economic prosperity, the international political environment and the effect of war.  Appendix B 
lists the dates used for Kondratieff waves and cycles of hegemony. 
In the late-modern set, we consider the effect of democracy (from Marshall and Jaggers 2009), 
inter-state war (Singer and Small 1972; Small and Singer 1982; Sarkees 2000) and, from 1960 onward, 
per capita GDP levels and growth rates (from World Bank 2009). The inclusion of a democracy measure 
follows Palmer and Whitten‟s (1999) arguments that popular political responses to inflation depend on 
the character of a democracy‟s ruling party.  More broadly, it seems likely that a political system‟s Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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characteristics will affect perceptions that laws and policies can be changed electorally, which can 
channel anti-state sentiments to political, rather than coercive, competition. 
Analytical Methods 
We use a random-effects probit model. A widely-cited literature on the analysis of this kind of 
data argues that analysts should incorporate terms that are designed to incorporate the effect of time‟s 
passage since the last onset of a revolutionary event (reviewed in Beck 2001).  We follow Carter and 
Signorino‟s (2007) argument that the use of a time variable, along with its squared and cubed terms, 
outperforms standard, and more complicated, methods of capturing these dynamics. 
Exploring the Inflation-Instability Relationship 
The behavior of inflation rates exhibits some degree of long-run cyclicality, but price volatility 
has been declining over the long-run. Likewise, states in our long-run set have become less vulnerable to 
revolt, and, in the 20
th century, the world as a whole is generally stable compared to European countries in 
previous centuries.  Periods in which inflation pressures rise correspond roughly to periods of heightened 
instability, and inflation pressures are generally higher in countries that experience revolt.  Figure 3 
(below) describes both the median cumulative rates and standard deviations over the preceding seven 
years in our long-run sample prior to 1900 and in our late-modern sample during much of the 20
th 
century.   
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
These figures make the differences in long-term inflationary versus price-stable periods more 
visible. During the inflationary waves of 1550 – 1650 and 1750 – 1820, median seven-year inflation rates 
generally exceeded the pre-19
th century mean of 0.8%.  Periods of long-term price stability (1650 – 1750 
and 1820 – 1900) saw inflation rates that were steadily below this mean, and often deflationary.  They 
also show the steady decline in price volatility over history‟s long-run.  Even during the Stagflation Era, 
price volatility was elevated but still compares quite favorably to historical periods of price stability.  This Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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comparison is even more favorable when one considers the fact that the late modern sample includes 
mostly non-core, and often very poor, countries.  Although median inflation averages and standard 
deviations appear to diverge in some periods, especially during the 18
th and early 19
th centuries, they are 
generally related positively.  Over the entire pre-20
th century period, seven-year inflation rates and 
standard deviations
xv register a highly significant pairwise correlation of 0.2807, and has a highly 
significant, but declining correlation that never drops below 0.17 in individual periods of inflation or 
price-stability. 
If we compare the historical behavior of prices to that of revolt, it is possible to discern a rough 
relationship.  Figure 4 (below) presents spike plots denoting the prevalence of revolt in our long-run (left) 
and late-modern (right) samples.   
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
Over time, political systems appear to have grown less prone to rebellion.  Although rebellion has 
become quite rare in the European countries of our long-run set, over the world it seems to afflict between 
10% and 15% of countries regularly.  These long-run trends notwithstanding, upswings in revolt appear to 
correspond roughly to periods of intensified inflationary pressures.  Revolt was very common during the 
16
th and 17
th century inflationary periods. A period of domestic pacification appears between 1618 – 
1648, when the Thirty Years War may have diverted what would have been domestically-directed 
pressures towards international conflict. This wave of inflation and political instability appears to break 
after the Thirty Years War.   Instability takes time to dissipate after inflation has settled, but this could be 
attributable to the residual effects of past instability.   
Between 1650 and 1750, long-term prices exhibit little long-term movement.  The Thirty Years 
War and chronic plague resulted in tremendous death, and the population‟s recovery took time to return to 
a point that prices would begin to again move upwards (Goldstone 1991; Fischer 1996). Over much of the 
18
th century, domestic politics were relatively placid in our sample.   Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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Revolt activity picks up near the end of the 18
th century, after a period of both rising prices and 
population growth.  Political instability and price inflation break around the time of the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.  From 1820s onward, domestic politics appear relatively calm in 
Europe, with the exception of a spike in revolts around 1848.  This stability generally holds through the 
overall deflationary 19
th century, and more or less price-stable (WWII and its immediate aftermath 
notwithstanding) 20
th century.  Although our late-modern European sample seems less prone to revolt, an 
intensification of rebellion‟s incidence breaks out during the Stagflation era of the late-20
th century. 
In our late-modern sample, depicted in this figure‟s right graph, represents the incidence of revolt 
in the 20
th century.  Political instability was more common in the world as a whole than in our European 
sample, and appears to have intensified significantly after 1971.  A two sample test of proportion suggests 
that the differences in the average annual rates of revolt during 1955 – 1971 (0.12, SD=0.006) are 
significantly lower from 1971 – 1995 (0.15, SD = 0.005) are significant at the Pr=0.01 level.  A similar 
test comparing 1971 – 1995 with 1995 – 2005 suggests that these differences are not significantly 
different.  After inflation was contained by 1995, political instability (in the form of revolt‟s prevalence) 
did not return to mid-century levels. 
Do inflation rates or volatility distinguish countries at risk of rebellion from those that are not?  
Table 1 (below) compares the lagged mean inflation rates and standard deviations that typically preceded 
country-years that experienced rebellion versus those that did not. As some inflation crises during the 
1971 – 1995 crisis were very severe, with cumulative annual inflation rates exceeding 200% and 
cumulative standard deviations exceeding 1000%, we top code these outliers at 100% (affecting less than 
3% of all observations in both cases). 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The table suggests that countries experiencing revolt did not exhibit significantly higher or more 
variable inflation rates prior to 1650.  During the inflationary wave of 1550 – 1650, we postulate that the Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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lack of a significant relationship is partly a result of the drop in revolts that took place during the context 
of the high inflation Thirty Years War.  In subsequent periods, countries that fall to revolt consistently 
register significantly higher rates of volatility.  In price stable periods, like 1650 – 1750 or 1820 – 1896, 
this volatility often involved serious deflation, and rendering the difference in cumulative inflation rates 
either insignificant (as in the 19
th century) or significant, but opposite from our expectations (as in 1650 – 
1750, where stable countries tended to experience more inflation).  In the 20
th century, inflation rates and 
price level variability are significantly higher in countries experiencing revolts. 
Of course, changes to inflation are very likely a small part of what creates specific incidences of 
rebellion.  Aside from idiosyncratic factors that lead to particular revolts in particular contexts, a range of 
macro-level variables probably influence countries‟ general risk of rebellion.  In the next section, we 
consider a few of these possible controls: economic prosperity, economic development, international 
order and democracy.  To tease out the partial effects of inflation on revolt, net of these factors, we turn to 
regression analysis. 
Analysis 
Inflation rates and volatility appear to offer some power in the prediction of a country‟s 
vulnerability to political revolt.  Our models find a significant relationship between inflationary pressures 
and rebellion in pre-20
th century Europe, but a lack of high-quality controls probably contributes to a 
sense of inflation‟s significance.  In our late-modern sample, the inclusion of better controls suggests that 
economic growth and development, as well as democracy, are stronger predictors of rebellion.  These 
variables could offer the strongest explanations of a long-term stabilization of political institutions in the 
West.  However, even when these controls are included, inflation appears to retain predictive power.  In 
all likelihood, rebellion is produced by a complex interaction of economic development, prosperity, 
political institutions and price system stability that might be best uncovered with alternative, more 
qualitatively-based, comparative-historical methods. Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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Long-Run Sample.  Table 2 (below) presents a random-effects model that predicts the onset of 
revolutionary situations in our long-term sample. The models consider the potential influence of both 
inflation rates, as the mean rate of inflation that took hold over the seven years preceding an 
observation
xvi, and variability, represented by the standard deviation of inflation rates over the preceding 
seven years. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Interpreting these results directly from the table is difficult, because both the dependent variable 
and key predictors are transformed or include higher-order terms.  To impart a sense of these estimates in 
more concrete terms, Table 3 (below) interprets these results as “75
th/25
th Percentile Differences”.  These 
figures which represent the ratio of a country‟s predicted odds of experiencing a revolt if they were to 
register a given variable score at the sample‟s 75
th versus 25
th percentile score, assuming all other 
predictors scored at the sample median.   
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Models One through Three examine the period of 1492 – 1900 as a whole. They provide a broad 
sense of inflation‟s relationship with revolt.  They suggest a country with typically high inflation 
variability (at the 75
th percentile) has 8% higher odds of experiencing a revolt.  For countries register 
inflation variability scores at the 95
th percentile generally register around 15% higher odds of 
experiencing revolt. Although this effect may seem modest, it is important to note that periods of elevated 
price instability could continue for many decades, and, once a country fell into revolt, it was far more 
vulnerable to subsequent revolt.  Inflation variance is not significant from 1550 – 1650, but is important 
in predicting instability after 1750.  We believe that this difference is attributable to the way that 
inflationary crises manifested themselves in 1550 – 1650 versus other periods.  In this earlier inflationary 
wave, rising prices took hold with persistent volatility.  In the 1750 – 1820 wave, political revolt 
remained pent up for some time, and was unleashed when financial systems fell into a period of volatility.  Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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Also, the instability surrounding the turn of the 19
th century involves wild swings into high inflation and 
severe deflation, suggesting that general monetary system instability acted as a trigger for revolt. 
Models Two and Three suggest that, over the entire pre-20
th century sample, Kondratieff waves 
are important.  These effects are attributable to the very large effects of Kondratieff waves during the late-
16
th/early-17
th century inflationary wave, and the mid- to late-19
th century.  We believe that its effect in 
Model Four is not capturing the effect of long-run economic prosperity, but rather a transition point in 
history that foreran Europe‟s immersion into the Thirty Years War and a concurrent long-term economic 
decline.  In other words, it is capturing a period in which that era‟s political pressures were high, but had 
not yet been redirected outward.  The negligible effect of war during this period is a likely product of 
having some its effects over the Thirty Years War having been washed out by the Kondratieff decline 
variable,  and some of its coincidence with revolution prior to the Thirty Years War pushing its effect into 
a positive range.  The apparently positive effects of Kondratieff Wave variables in the 19
th century are 
probably produced by the political calm that took place during the long-term economic growth of the 
Industrial Revolution.  These variables compare the incidence of political rebellion relative to a baseline 
comparison group of years in which the world economy was expanding. 
The table imparts a very strong sense that previous rebellion shapes a country‟s vulnerability to 
subsequent rebellion.  The 75
th and 25
th percentiles of these variables register scores of 30 – 35 years and 
2 – 5 years, respectively, and do not vary widely across sub-samples.  A country with that has enjoyed 
around three decades without rebellion is predicted in these models to have anywhere between one-tenth 
and one-half the odds of falling into subsequent revolt, relative to a country that experienced revolt only a 
few years ago.  This dynamic helps explain why revolutionary activity tends to cluster historically.  
Countries tend to fall into cycles of revolt once they first experience it.  As a result, even a slightly 
elevated risk of revolt of 10% - 20% can represent a serious risk. Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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Late Modern Sample.  Table 4 (below) examines the relationship between inflation and political 
revolt in our late modern sample.  Limitations on GDP data prior to 1960 and war data after 1997 require 
us to look at these relationships under different model specifications, but they collectively result in a 
common message: economic development and prosperity are the most significant predictors of rebellion, 
and these factors, along with democracy, condition the effects of inflation.  Still, our models suggest a 
90% likelihood that inflation‟s relationship with the onset of rebellion is significant. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
These results are interpreted below in Table 5, using the same 75
th/25
th percentile comparisons 
used above in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Although the panel is heavily unbalanced, models in a more balanced and less representative set 
render substantively similar results.  The models suggest a 90% likelihood that inflation‟s relationship 
with revolt is significant, net of the effects of residual instability, democracy, economic growth and 
wealth.  Inflation rates and variability covary more strong in the 20
th century – with a highly-significant 
pairwise correlation of 0.89 – and may wash each others‟ effects out.  The comparisons between Models 
Eleven and Twelve suggest that their effects are commensurate.   
Table 5 predicts differences of a +8% - +11% higher risk of rebellion in a country whose inflation 
variability sits at the sample‟s 75
th versus 25
th percentile levels (22% versus 5% for 1945 – 2006).  
Although these differences are modest, both inflation rates and variability have a very strong, positive 
skew.  Inflation variability scores at this same sample‟s 90
th, 95
th and 99
th percentiles are 52%, 112% and 
1900% are predicted to have +15% to +40% higher odds of experiencing revolt relative to a country with 
variance levels of 5%.   Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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The predicted effects of residual instability in Table 5 shaped by a change in historical context, 
but also the sample‟s increased representativeness and possibly differences in the ways that revolts are 
coded in our long-run versus late-modern set.  The predicted effects of residual effects are different than 
in the long-run set.  Although they predict that the likelihood of revolt diminishes in the first fifteen years 
after a revolt (-65% lower odds compared to the first year following a revolt), it begins to rise thereafter 
until 39 years after a revolt (-21% lower odds) and fall thereafter.  Over the world as a whole, anti-
government rebellion is much more common than it is when we restrict our focus to Europe, and these 
effects predict that countries will typically be more vulnerable to major challenges as time passes until a 
very long history of political stability is established. 
The effects of democracy and per capita GDP are considerable.  One interpretation of these 
results is that both wealth and democracy raise the threshold beyond which disaffect materialized into 
rebellion.  Democratic systems give discontents a peaceful means of changing governments, and wealth 
may mitigate the absolute hardship experienced in economic downturns.  Furthermore, a wealthier society 
has more to lose if its governments collapse.  In a rich democracy, it may be in fewer people‟s interests to 
mount serious, open challenges to the state.  This does not imply that wealthy democracies are immune 
from political problems during economic crises, but, in stable and wealthy democracies, these problems 
may product government turnover. 
Finally, economic growth affects countries‟ vulnerability to rebellion.  Although growth‟s effect 
is stronger than inflation when comparing 75
th and 25
th percentile effects, growth lacks the high variability 
of prices.  Many of the economic problems that high inflation produces, like desperation, insecurity, 
conflict and tight government budgets, are also produced during economic recessions.  In addition, 
serious inflation problems are argued to produce economic recessions (Bruno and Easterly 1998), which 
could compound inflation‟s effects. 
 
 




This paper examined the historical incidence of chronic global inflation, and its relationship with 
political rebellion over the past five centuries.  Although the institutions of money and government have 
evolved a great deal over this time, we remain vulnerable to a destabilization of the money system, and in 
turn the erosion of government finances.  Price problems are probably caused by a complicated mixture of 
problems that we have not yet conquered, and may reappear as a serious issue in the coming years.  We 
show that even normal differences in price system disruptions cause marginally higher risks of revolt, and 
their threat to stability can become extreme if inflation and price volatility become serious, as they did 
only a few decades ago.  These risks are compounded by the fact that, once a country‟s political order is 
disrupted, it risks further instability. 
Should the world‟s money systems fall into inflationary spirals again, our analysis suggests that 
more countries will experience political instability.  Those who are most likely to be affected are poorer 
and more authoritarian countries, and our results suggest that spurring growth and securing democratic 
institutions in these countries are probably priorities if they wish to avoid rebellion.  Although we in the 
West may be insulated from the threat of open rebellion, perhaps in part due to our wealth and 
democracies, inflation produces a range of problems that will raise the stakes of economic policy and 
possibly produce more vigorous political conflict.  It may also create a greater likelihood of change.  
Governments face a great deal of inertia when attempting reform, and may need to be threatened 
themselves before advancing major, and potentially disruptive, policy projects.  An inflationary crisis 
would certainly be an occasion for such change. 
Despite the immense economic prosperity and stability of the late-1990s and early 2000s, public 
finances remained stretched and vulnerable to shock.  When this shock came in 2008, governments 
seemed to prioritize the defense of their money systems.  In the United States and elsewhere, governments 
have been repeatedly criticized for defending financial institutions, who are widely seem as key, if not 
principle, culprits of the crisis.  Prioritizing the well-being of banks is a highly pragmatic decision, rather Cohen & Linton – Inflation, Political Rebellion & the Neoliberal Revolution 
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than one rooted in notions of justice.  In defending the financial system, governments are attempting to 
secure a key social infrastructure upon which our entire political economic edifice rests.  That system‟s 
collapse not only imperils the complex web upon which trade, business, jobs and retirement savings rests, 
but also possibly the solvency of, and order established by, governments themselves.  
Should our problems worsen, it seems likely that neoliberal policy – or at least its concrete 
manifestations like globalization, deregulation, privatization and so on – will be the subject of more 
intense debate.  Although the past twenty years of economic policy attract much antipathy, neoliberalism 
did not fail entirely.  The world‟s money systems were breaking down, governments were progressively 
falling into bankruptcy, and societies were in acute political economic crisis.  Neoliberalism helped 
resolve a serious global economic crisis and restored political and economic stability, even if imperfectly.  
There is much to criticize about neoliberalism, but an inordinate focus on attacking the ideology risks 
losing sight of the deeper problems it was attempting to resolve.  They still need to be addressed. 
Although it tackled countries‟ money system and government solvency problems on many fronts, 
neoliberalism not only maintained a vulnerability to speculation but depended on it.  Speculators helped 
fund government borrowing, secure inward investment and the acquisition of hard money, enabled 
governments to off-load old obligations (like pensions or public investment) and fuel moments of 
economic prosperity.    We are now very aware of the downside associated with having an economy in 
which speculation is rampant.  Any post-neoliberal economic order needs to find practical solutions for 
reestablishing the stability of money and solvency of governments.  If speculators are to be replaced, 
something else has do help secure our money‟s and governments‟ solvency.  Political economic systems 
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Figure 1: Inter-Quartile Range of Annual Inflation Rates, Seven Countries, 1492 – 2005.  Vertical 
blue lines demarcate range between 25
th and 75
th percentile single-year inflation scores in any given year. 
 

























































































































Figure 2: Box Plot of Inflation Rates, 1930 - 2005.  Represents data for an unbalanced panel of 164 
















































































































































































































































































































































   
Figure 3: Median Lagged Seven Year Inflation Rates and Standard Deviation, 1492 – 1900 (left) and 1930 – 2005 (right).  Note that these graphs 
depict different samples – see Methods section.  Solid blue lines denote the median score for countries‟ mean inflation rates over the preceding years, 
and is scaled to the left axis.  The solid horizontal red line at the left axis‟ 0.8% (left) and 6.5% (right) marks is the median score for this variable over 
the entire pre-20
th century period.  The dashed red line represents median standard deviation of inflation by year, and is scaled to the right axis.  The 
dashed horizontal red line at the right axis‟ 16% (left) and 11% (right) marks represents the median score for this variable over the time period studied 
here.  Vertical dashed lines mark the years that are commonly argued to be periods in which the world system transitioned from periods of secular 
inflation to stability or vice-versa. 











































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Incidence of Revolutionary Situations, Long-Run Sample from 1492 – 1992 (left) and Late-Modern Sample from 1930 – 2005 (right).  Vertical 
dashed lines denote periods commonly cited as transition periods between eras of secular inflation and long-term price stability.  Note that the two graphs use 


















































































































































































































































Table 1: Mean Cumulative Inflation Rates and Variation, 
by Period of Secular Inflationary Wave or Price Stability 
Period 
  No 
Revolt  Revolt  Pr(diff) 
1492 – 1550  Rates  1.5  1.3  0.6113 
 
SD  20.3  15.2  0.0144 
1550 - 1650  Rates  2.1  2.5  0.3751 
 
SD  25.9  27.8  0.3377 
1650 - 1750  Rates  0.8  0.04  0.0116 
 
SD  19.1  22.1  0.0092 
1750 - 1820  Rates  1.0  2.3  0.0000 
 
SD  16.0  27.2  0.0000 
1820 - 1896  Rates  0.4  0.9  0.3238 
 
SD  14.1  46.0  0.0000 
1955 - 1971  Rates  6.53  12.5  0.0000 
 
SD  12.3  22.8  0.0000 
1971 - 1995  Rates  15.6  23.3  0.0000 
 
SD  19.7  29.1  0.0000 
1995 – 2005  Rates  13.5  22.3  0.0000 
  SD  18.8  29.4  0.0000 
Rates = Cumulative Lagged Mean Seven-Year Inflation Rates; 
SD = Standard Deviation of Inflation Rates over Preceding 
Seven Years.  Pr(diff) = Probability that differences between 








Table 2: Random-Effects Probit of Incidence of Revolutionary Situations on Inflation Rates, 1492 - 1900 
Model  One  Two  Three  Four  Five  Six  Seven 
Years  1492-1900  1492 - 1900  1492-1900  1550 - 1650  1650 - 1750  1750 - 1820†  1820 - 1900† 
tlast  -0.202***  -0.201***  -0.203***  -0.258***  -0.171***  -0.297***  -0.180^ 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.054)  (0.094) 
tlast2  0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.009***  0.004***  0.010***  0.005 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
tlast3  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Cum. Inflation Rates  0.060  0.060 
 
0.356*** 
      (square root)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
 
(0.159) 
      Inflation Variance  0.255***  0.255***  0.264*** 
   
0.689**  0.479*** 
(logged)  (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.076) 
   




   
-0.280 
   
   
(0.130) 
   
(0.286) 
    Hegemony: Decline 
 
-0.136 
         
   
(0.240) 
          Hegemony: None 
 
-0.059 
   
-0.699* 
   
   
(0.119) 
   
(0.289) 
    Kondratieff: Peak 
 
0.314*  0.316*  0.786***  -0.197  -0.299  1.438*** 
   
(0.143)  (0.142)  (0.231)  (0.304)  (0.403)  (0.161) 
Kondratieff: Decline 
 
0.070  0.052  0.159  -0.432*  0.410^  0.766^ 
   
(0.105)  (0.104)  (0.202)  (0.207)  (0.247)  (0.454) 
Kondratieff: Trough 
 
0.237^  0.234^  0.399  0.362  0.510  1.213** 
   
(0.133)  (0.132)  (0.263)  (0.243)  (0.594)  (0.458) 
Major War 
 
0.128  0.146^  0.345^ 
     
   
(0.092)  (0.087)  (0.178) 
      Core of WS 
 
-0.103 
         
   
(0.131) 
          Constant  -0.805**  -0.787*  -0.825**  -1.555*  0.751*  -1.734*  -2.172*** 
 
(0.297)  (0.354)  (0.277)  (0.648)  (0.343)  (0.792)  (0.342) 
N  2100  2100  2100  539  707  332  393 
N(groups)  7  7  7  7  7  7  6 
log-likelihood  -598.4  -593.0  -593.9  -175.7  -195.1  -92.52  -58.1 
AIC  1210.8  1216.0  1207.8  371.5  410.2  197.0  126.1 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10; Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients 
†Results are from cross-sectional probit.  Tests suggests random-effects not significant in this period. 






Table 3: 75th/25th Percentile Differences, Results from Table 2: Random-Effects Probit of Incidence of Revolutionary Situations on 
Inflation Rates, 1492 - 1900Table 2 
Model  One  Two  Three  Four  Five  Six  Seven 
Time Since Last Revolt  18%  18%  17%  55%  25%  31%  9% 
Cumulative Inflation Rates  n.s.  n.s.  -  107%  -  -  - 
Cumulative Inflation Variability  108%  108%  108%  -  -  119%  113% 
Hegemony: None  -  n.s.  -  -  49%  -  - 
Kondratieff: Peak  -  137%  137%  219%  n.s.  n.s.  420% 
Kondratieff: Decline  -  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  65%  151%  215% 
Kondratieff: Trough  -  127%  126%  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  307% 
War 
 
n.s.  116%  142%  -  -  - 
Represents ratio of predicted value of country that scores at the model’s sample’s 75
th percentile versus 25
th percentile, 
other predictors at median.  n.s. = not significant; - = not in model 
 
    
 
 
Table 4: Random-Effects Probit of Revolts, Post-War Era 
Model  Eight  Nine  Ten  Eleven  Twelve  Thirteen 
Years  1945 - 1997  1945 - 1997  1960 - 1997  1960-1997  1960-1997  1960-2006 
tlast  -0.189***  -0.190***  -0.193***  -0.194***  -0.194***  -0.235*** 
 
(0.021)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.020) 
tlast2  0.008***  0.009***  0.009***  0.009***  0.009***  0.011*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
tlast3  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation Rates  0.074^  0.104***  0.026 
 
0.057^  0.053* 
(logged)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.052) 
 
(0.031)  (0.027) 
Inflation Variance  0.040 
 
0.036  0.057^ 
    (logged)  (0.040) 
 
(0.049)  (0.030) 
    Democracy  -0.024***  -0.024***  -0.013*  -0.012^  -0.013* 
 
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
  International War  -0.149 
 
-0.148 









-0.033***  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.032*** 
   
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Per Capita GDP 
   
-0.153***  -0.149***  -0.158***  -0.178*** 
(logged) 
   
(0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.037) 
Constant  -0.792***  -0.746***  -0.543***  -0.537***  -0.510***  -0.313** 
 
(0.119)  (0.109)  (0.134)  (0.133)  (0.126)  (0.104) 
N  3958  3958  3087  3087  3087  4462 
N(groups)  125  123  117  117  117  154 
log-likelihood  -1276.1  -1276.9  -960.6  -960.7  -960.9  -1306.2 
AIC  2570.1  2576.8  1942.7  1939.4  1939.7  2628.4 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.10; Standard errors in parentheses under coefficients  
 
 
Table 5: 75th/25th Percentile Differences, Results from Table 4 
Model  Eight  Nine  Ten  Eleven  Twelve  Thirteen 
Time Since Last Revolt  52%  66%  49%  48%  48%  49% 
Cumulative Inflation Rates  111%  115%  n.s.  -  108%  108% 
Cumulative Inflation Variability  n.s.  -  n.s.  108%  -  - 
Democracy  70%  70%  82%  82%  82%  - 
International War  n.s.  -  n.s.  -  -  - 
Per Capita GDP Growth  -  -  83%  83%  83%  84% 
Per Capita GDP  -  -  68%  69%  67%  64% 
Represents ratio of predicted value of country that scores at the model’s sample’s 75
th percentile versus 25
th 











                                                           
i There are many ways of consummating economic transactions or sustaining economic relationships without 
money, like barter, individual trust, organizations, collectives or vassal-lord-like relationships.  These means of 
organizing economic activity have been common historically, and many of them continue to sustain a wide range of 
transacting today.  However, it is hard to envision how these alternative, non-money-based methods of coordinating 
economic relationships could sustain a larger, modern economy to deliver our current material standard-of-living or 
lifestyle.  Money is not necessary for the organization of economic activity, but is one upon which we are reliant if 
modern economic institutions are to be reproduced on a scale to which we have become accustomed.   
ii Enables transactants to separate the act of economic production and consumption by enabling them to take place 
with different people, in different places, at different times and in different quantities. 
iii A benchmark that several researchers identify as a threshold beyond which price pressures can clearly be 
considered high (Bruno and Easterly 1998; Fischer, Sahay and Végh 2002). 
iv These countries include Austria-Hungary/Austria, England/Great Britain/United Kingdom, France, Dutch 
Republic/Netherlands, Ottoman Empire/Turkey, Poland and Sweden.  For these countries, we have at least 340 
inflation data points, with a mean representation of 415.  England and France are fully represented.  In no year are 
less than five countries‟ inflation figures reported. 
v The practice of drawing contracts that automatically adjust prices to inflation. 
vi Schiller (2003) finds the earliest example of interest indexation to occur in late-18
th century Massachusetts, but 
argues that they only came into wide usage after WWII.  Wage indexation in a major US labor contract first 
appeared in 1948 (Ehrenberg, Danziger and San 1983). 
vii Its adoption was slow enough that, two hundred years later, roughly 10% of US households still lacked any 
ownership of a bank account (Hogarth, Anguelov and Lee 2004).   
viii Although sample representativeness varies over time, the general shape of the graph is similar to one in which a 
limited sample of highly-represented cases are used.  The basic message imparted by the graph does not depend on 
the sample being balanced. 
ix In contrast with Goldstone, Fischer sees population growth as being driven by fertility choice, which is taken to 
occur where life‟s amenities are abundant relative to population and real wages are rising as a result of labor 
shortages.   
x like the 1987 Crash, 1990s‟ developing world currency crises, the Long-Term Capital Management crisis or the 
dot-com crash 
xi Austria (Austria-Hungary / Hapsburg Monarchy), France, Netherlands (Dutch Republic), Poland, Sweden, Turkey 
(Ottoman Empire), United Kingdom (England / Great Britain) 
xii A concept drawn from Tilly (1993) that represents the presence or absence of a situation in which competing 
political contenders, each with popular support, claim exclusive controls of the state or some segment of it.   
xiii For pre-1960 years, particularly country-years‟ inflation scores were determined as follows.  Data were compiled 
via a procedure in which the inflation data set that correlated best with the World Development Indicators (which we 
take to be our most authoritative set) replaced any missing values.  Then, the set whose inflation values correlated 
best with the resulting data set replaced remaining missing values.  This process continued until we were left with 
data sets that correlated poorly (ρ < 0.500) with this compilation‟s figures. 
xiv The choice of seven years is, to some degree, arbitrary, but this specification performed best in our exploratory 
research. 
xv In which the latter is log-transformed and the former is square-root transformed 
xvi In these models, seven-year inflation rates are top- and bottom-coded at 15% and -5%, respectively, which affect 
less than 1% of the sample in both cases.  The variable is shifted and transformed by square root. 